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GENOMICS, PUBLIC HEALTH AND IDENTITY
Ruth Chadwick*
Abstract: This paper questions the utility of the ethical principles that are usually invoked to deal with genomic issues,
particularly genetic databases. Concepts such as solidarity, benefit sharing, equity, public participation, and collective
identity are discussed. The author argues that genetic banks are precipitating new concern over group interest, as opposed
to concern over issues arising from individualistic medical ethics. Genomics era needs new paradigms in ethics. An
individualistic approach based on choice and autonomy is not useful, because we make choices not only as individuals but
also as members of different groups. The doctrine of informed consent evolved in different historical conditions from the
ones we face in the era of genomics. This is complicated by the global context of genetic research, in addition to powerful
commercial interests. This suggests that it is not sufficient to move from an individual-centred ethic approach to a more
community-centred one; an approach of renegotiating the relationship between individual and community. We need also
to be clear about what the interests at stake are, which may mean reconceiving the terms ‘individual’ and ‘community’ in
this context and the ways in which their interests are affected, identifying the sources of collective identity that are at stake.
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GENÓMICA, SALUD PÚBLICA E IDENTIDAD
Resumen: Este artículo cuestiona la utilidad de los principios éticos que son generalmente aludidos para abordar
problemas de genómica, particularmente los de bancos de datos genéticos. Conceptos como solidaridad, compartir los
beneficios, equidad, participación pública e identidad colectiva son discutidos. La autora sugiere que los bancos de
datos genéticos están generando nuevas preocupaciones sobre los intereses del grupo, preocupaciones opuestas a los
temas de una ética médica individualista. La era de la genómica necesita nuevos paradigmas éticos. Un enfoque
individualista basado en la elección y la autonomía no es útil, puesto que tomamos decisiones no sólo como individuos
sino también como miembros de diferentes grupos. La doctrina del consentimiento informado surgió en condiciones
históricas diferentes de las que enfrentamos en la era de la genómica. Esto se complica por el contexto global de la
investigación genómica y la presencia de poderosos intereses comerciales. Ello sugiere que no es suficiente moverse
desde un enfoque centrado en el individuo a un enfoque más centrado en la comunidad; uno de renegociación de la
relación entre individuo y comunidad. Necesitamos también tener claro cuáles son los intereses en riesgo, lo que puede
significar redefinir los términos “individuo” y “comunidad” en este contexto y los modos en que sus intereses pueden
ser afectados, identificando las fuentes de identidad colectiva que están en riesgo.
Palabras clave: Genómica, ética, bancos de datos genéticos, identidad colectiva, intereses individuales,
intereses colectivos, comunidad
GENOMICA, SAUDE PÚBLICA E IDENTIDADE
Resumo: Esse artigo questíona a utilidade dos princípios éticos que se aludem geralmente para abordar problemas do
genoma, em particular os de bases de dados genéticas. Conceitos tão a solidariedade, a dividir os benefícios, a equidade, a
participação pública, e a identidade coletiva pública tratam. O autora sugire que as bases de dados genéticas estão gerando
novas inquietudes pelos juros do grupo, inquietudes opostas aos temas de uma ética médica individualista. A era da
genômica necessita de novos paradigmas éticos. Um enfoque individualista baseado na a eleição e a autonomia não é útil,
porque nós tomamos decisões não apenas como indivíduos como também como membros de diferentes grupos. A doutrina
do consentimento fundamentado surgiu em diferentes condições históricas das quais nós olhamos na era da genômica. Isto
se complica mais pelo contexto global da pesquisa genômica e da presença de juros comerciais potentes. Isto indica que
não é suficiente de mover de um enfoque estado centrado no indivíduo a um enfoque mais centrado na comunidade; um de
renegociação da relação entre individuo e a comunidade. Nós necessitamos estar também seguros o qual são os juros em
risco, que pode significar redefinindo os terminos do “indivíduo” e a “comunidade” nesse contexto e as modalidades
nestes seus juros podem ser afetados, identificando as fontes de identidade coletiva que estão em risco.
Palavras chave: Genômica, ética, bases de dados genéticas, identidade coletiva, juros individuais, juros do coletivo,
comunidade
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Introduction
The growth of a public health agenda in
genomics has raised anew the debate about ge-
netic exceptionalism. In the field of ethics,
while in clinical genetics individualism has pre-
vailed, proposals for population biobanks have
invoked principles of solidarity and benefit-
sharing; concepts of gift and global public
goods. What is needed, however, is attention
to notions of identity in both contexts, indi-
vidual and collective.
Science (6 June 2003) carried a story about
a proposal to establish an African-American
population biobank. The aim is to collect DNA
samples from 25,000 volunteers over five years
to “help disentangle genetics from socio-eco-
nomic and other environmental factors in un-
derstanding disease among African Ameri-
cans”. It is also hoped that it will change atti-
tudes among this group, who has been distrust-
ful of medical research since the scandal of the
Tuskegee syphilis studies. As the Science ar-
ticle points out, the role of race and ethnicity in
thinking about medical ethics and policy is con-
troversial because the genetic differences be-
tween individuals within a ‘race’ are greater
than differences between ethnic groups. This
reinforces the view that differential incidence
of diseases between groups may be strongly
influenced by socio-economic factors such as
discrimination. Nevertheless such biobanks
will, it is envisaged, facilitate the acquisition
of more soundly based information on the re-
spective inputs of genes and environment.
While health inequalities between different
groups have long been an issue in medical eth-
ics, I want to suggest that the move to popula-
tion biobanks puts group interests, rather than
individualistic medical ethics, more promi-
nently on the agenda. The question is whether
we have the theoretical resources to deal with
this. Ironically, as we move in this direction,
the purported benefits of genetic research are
increasingly framed in terms of individual ben-
efits, as in the clams for the future of
individualised prescribing arising out of phar-
macogenetics and nutrigenomics. The follow-
ing quotation is illustrative of an approach
which sees genetic possibilities as a mechanism
of individual empowerment:
While rapid progress continues, there is
much you can do now for yourself and
your loved ones. Know your family his-
tory, be cognizant of your ethnic origin,
determine your genetic susceptibilities,
opt for necessary gene tests, take preven-
tive actions, establish appropriate surveil-
lance, and seek pre-emptive treatment
where applicable. In this way, you can
exercise control over your genetic destiny,
secure your health, and –in more ways
than you yet realize– save your life
(Milunsky, 2001, xv).
I want to suggest that we need to think again
about individualism: in particular, reliance on the
individual choice model alone is likely to prove
insufficient. And yet social science research, in
the UK at least, has suggested that people are
becoming increasingly individualistic in their
thinking1.
The more that we understand about the hu-
man genome, the greater the possibilities for
developing tests, of different kinds, that can be
offered to individuals. Discussion initially fo-
cused on cases such as establishing that an indi-
vidual has a disorder traceable to a single gene,
such as Huntington’s. If an individual tests posi-
tive for the Huntington’s gene he or she is virtu-
ally certain to develop the disorder in middle life.
1 Research by Paul Whiteley for the ESRC Democracy and
Participation programme, reported on BBC Radio 4 Today
programme 24 September 2003
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Not all genetic tests are of this kind however.
Others would enable two would-be parents to
establish whether they were both carriers of a
recessive gene that would give them a one-in-
four chance of having an affected child. Again,
there are tests that establish, not whether an in-
dividual has one of the genetic disorders as such,
but whether he or she has a genetic make-up that
would put him or her at higher than average risk
of developing one of the common diseases, such
as breast cancer, or heart disease.
Into this frame we now have to put the de-
velopment of new types of test. We are all fa-
miliar with going to the doctor and receiving a
prescription for medication. It is envisaged that,
in the light of advances in genetics, the prac-
tice of medicine as we know it may in future be
quite different. Among the types of genetic test
that are likely to become available in the next
few years is a ‘medicine response test’. The
point of this will be to test individuals for in-
formation regarding their likely response to
drugs in the light of their particular genetic pro-
file. Pharmacogenetics is the term used to de-
scribe the use of genetic information to show
how variations in patients’ DNA may affect
drug responsiveness and susceptibility to side
effects. Pharmacogenetics will enable us to
identify who will be likely to benefit and who
harmed. If we could establish this in advance,
the argument goes, doctors could prescribe
more safely and effectively – prescribing would
become more tailored to the individual than it
is now. The whole practice of medicine could
become much more ‘geneticised’ by this de-
velopment in what is called pharmacogenetics.
It is not clear, however, how this would work –
would doctors test the patient at the time of pre-
scription or would information about
everyone’s genetic make-up be kept on a data-
base that could be accessed by physicians or
perhaps by pharmacists? Or would we have our
own ‘smart cards’?
In addition to developments in
pharmacogenomics, there is increasing inter-
est in analogous possibilities in nutrigenomics
(Müller and Kersten, 2003). As society goes
further down the path of grappling with the is-
sues of the postgenome era, the relationship
between genetics and diet is becoming increas-
ingly central. The UK Department of Health
White Paper, Our Inheritance, Our Future
(2003) states that:
…the way external factors and genes in-
teract to cause disease or protect us from
disease will be better understood. This
information will allow people with cer-
tain genetic profiles to avoid foods,
chemicals or environmental factors, such
as smoking, which are particularly risky
for them (DoH, 2003.)
Here the issues of nutrigenomics arise: the
application of genomics in nutrition research,
enabling associations to be made between spe-
cific nutrients and genetic factors, e.g. the way
in which foods or food ingredients influence
gene expression; and the study of individual
differences at the genetic level influencing re-
sponse to diet.
Ethics and the individual
There have long been arguments that there
is something special about genetics which
makes the presumptions that have operated in
medical ethics inappropriate. This idea about
specialness is known as genetic excep-
tionalism. Genetic exceptionalism holds that
there is a difference in kind between genetics
and other areas of medicine, because, for ex-
ample, genetic information is predictive, not
specific to time, and shared between blood rela-
tives. There is a weight of argument, however,
against genetic exceptionalism that points to
other areas of medicine that share, at least to
some extent, some of these features: there are
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non-genetic tests that are predictive; a person’s
HIV status is relevant not only to him or her-
self.
Pharmacogenetics and nutrigenomics, how-
ever, raise anew the thesis of ‘genetic
exceptionalism’. What we might call pharma-
cogenetic exceptionalism suggests that pharma-
cogenetics will change the practice of medicine
more than ever by producing ‘personal pills’
and challenging expectations of professional
roles. Similar considerations apply with regard
to nutrigenomics and the possibilities of
individualised dietary advice. We have to con-
sider suggestions of new paradigms in medi-
cine and nutrition, following from the new sci-
entific paradigms arising out of the Human
Genome Project, and possibly new paradigms
in ethics.
I think it is fair to say that in the context of
clinical genetics and health service delivery, the
prevailing ethical framework, what I call the
‘standard view’, has been individualistic, be-
ing based on the autonomy and choice of the
individual.
• Individuals and couples undergoing genetic
tests, particularly in the reproductive con-
text, should have access to non-directive
genetic counselling.
• Population screening should only be carried
out where there is scope for action for the
individuals who test positive.
•  Individuals, on this model, have both a right
to know and a right not to know genetic in-
formation about themselves, and
• should be given the opportunity for informed
consent to donating a DNA sample.
It is also important, however, to have regard
to constructions of individual identity in these
contexts.
Autonomy and identity
We live in an era in which information, and
individual choice, is, in general, prized. The
argument for this can be supported from more
than one kind of ethical perspectives, involv-
ing the notion of individual autonomy. Every
ethical theory presupposes a particular under-
standing of the individual agent. From a utili-
tarian point of view, the individual agent is re-
garded as a utility maximizer – he or she will,
if rational, act to promote their interests. Indi-
vidual autonomy, on this perspective, consists
in choosing what one sees as good, on the ba-
sis of what one wants. Each individual agent is
helped in maximising his or her own utility by
having the relevant information to take into
account, e.g. about their future health risks, or
predisposition to side effects from particular
drugs, and this also arguably facilitates the util-
ity of the larger group. It is in general in the
best interests of society that individuals should
make informed decisions about their own fu-
ture good. Although in particular cases it may
seem that the best consequences can be
achieved by keeping people in ignorance, nev-
ertheless we have seen several well publicised
instances in the media of cases where a great
deal of anger has been caused by people being
denied information -in medical settings, in par-
ticular. So facilitating individual choice by
making information available can be supported
on the grounds that it tends to lead to the best
overall consequences.
From another point of view, individual au-
tonomy does not consist in pursuing one’s in-
terests as defined by one’s desires or one’s in-
dividual conception of the good. On the con-
trary, it consists in making a responsible choice,
as a rational moral agent. It could be argued
that there is a duty to be well-informed in or-
der to fulfil one’s duty to oneself and others. It
is not that having the information will maximise
one’s utility: the question is whether a choice
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not to know a piece of genetic information is
right. Consider the example of the option to
know whether one had a genetic predisposition
which made one much more likely to suffer
from lung cancer if one smoked. Could a choice
not to know this be supported - choosing not to
know a piece of information that could be in-
strumental in preventing premature death? In
the past few years, however, there have been
more frequent arguments that there is a right
not to know genetic information about our-
selves (Chadwick et al., 1997). Although, as we
have seen, there are considerations that favour
making information available to individuals so
that they can make informed choices about what
is in their best interests, there is a difference
between making information available and forc-
ing it upon people if they do not want it. On the
utilitarian version of autonomy, different util-
ity maximisers might take different views, ac-
cording to their own preferences and attitudes
to risk. It is a commonplace that people differ
in this respect. We make a distinction between
those we call ‘risk lovers’ and those we call’
risk averse’. Even if it is the case that there
might be arguments for knowing genetic infor-
mation that is potentially life-saving, however,
the amount of genetic information that is cov-
ered by this criterion is a relatively small pro-
portion.
Let us look at an example. There has been
considerable debate over the question of
whether there is a ‘homosexuality gene’, al-
though it is now generally recognised that to
speak in this way, of a ‘gene for’ a condition or
characteristic, is very misleading. Genetic in-
fluences, where they exist, are likely to be very
complex, not direct causal chains between one
gene and one characteristic. That being said,
let us suppose that it did become possible to
have access to some information about genetic
influences on one’s sexual orientation. Here I
want to turn to considerations of autonomy and
identity. Today we recognise the important role
that sexuality can play in an individual’s iden-
tity. Establishing and protecting one’s identity
as an individual human is a wider if not a richer
notion than the notion of moral agent. The right
to preserve one’s self-image has itself been ad-
vanced as an argument for a right not to know
certain genetic information. Peter Widmer, for
example, has argued that “I am not obliged to
agree…to receive information … which could
lead me to modify my picture of myself in an
undesirable manner” (Widmer, 1994). Although
there may be problems arising from self-decep-
tion in some cases where an individual’s self-
image is too far divorced from reality, we might
think that there are reasons for understanding
autonomy here in a different sense, in terms of
making decisions about one’s life as a whole,
about what kind of person to be overall, rather
than what to do in particular situations – for
example, instead of thinking in terms of whether
or not to take test x or not, the question would
be: do I want to be the sort of person who takes
every test available, or would I prefer to take
things as they come? As the genetic ‘revolu-
tion’ advances, the latter choice may become
reduced in some contexts. It may be the case
that it will come to be regarded as negligent
and contrary to medical ethics, for example, for
doctors to prescribe medication without rel-
evant genetic information, whether or not we
want to know it ourselves. It is, then, not only
the case that ethics can help us to think about
what is acceptable in genetics, but advances in
genetics can change our view about what is ethi-
cally acceptable.
Genes can also be associated with our con-
ceptions of our own identity in a deeper sense.
Whereas in the past it may have been the norm
to think of one’s identity in terms of one’s soul,
it is becoming more common to speak of one’s
identity as connected in some sense with the
genes (Nelkin and Lindee, 1995). This to some
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extent explains the widespread revulsion to-
wards reproductive cloning, and the objection
expressed by many people to the deliberate cre-
ation of a being with an identical genome to
another. It has to be said, however, that it can
also explain some of the attraction of reproduc-
tive cloning to those who support it. People who
have lost a loved one, for example, may think
that it is possible to bring them back in some
sense by creating a genetic ‘replica’ by clon-
ing. This kind of thinking has been encouraged
by stories that some scientists working on the
Human Genome Project have claimed that an
individual’s identity could be encapsulated in
a disk containing all their genetic information.
Some have used ‘reductionist’ language sug-
gesting that we can all, ultimately, be reduced
to or explained by our DNA sequences, so that
to know a person’s genes is to know all there is
to know about them. Others, however, suggest
that this kind of thinking is a mistake. Human
beings are much more than their genes: our
environment and experiences play a part in cre-
ating who we are, so to try to recreate a lost
loved one, even if reproductive cloning of hu-
mans were both practicable and permissible,
would on this view result in disappointment.
Nevertheless, even if our identity as human
beings cannot be completely reduced to our
genes, it may well be true that our genes play a
large part in influencing how we think about
our selves, in more ways than the issue of how
we take decisions about our future health. If it
becomes possible to establish links between
genetic factors and behavioural characteristics,
as is envisaged by some, we may find ourselves
as individuals given access to information about
our tendency to be happy or sad, prone to take
risks or cautious, and so on. It is not just how
we think of our own future development as in-
dividuals, however, that is open to being af-
fected by developments in genetics: there are
also relational issues to consider. Knowledge
about who our genetic relatives are, for ex-
ample, has always been seen as important and
it can be traumatic for those who either know
nothing of their genetic parentage or find out
that it is quite different from what they imag-
ined, because we partly construct our identity
in relation to others. We make choices not only
as individuals, but also as members of a num-
ber of different groups. This will be very im-
portant in relation to biobanks.
Partly because of the need for research for
the purposes of pharmacogenetics, we are now
witnessing the setting up of large population
databases, which will facilitate research of dif-
ferent kinds: association studies to establish
links between genetic profiles and common
disease; and association studies to establish re-
sponse to drug toxicity, for example.
Let us consider a scenario in which a phar-
maceutical company is undertaking a clinical
trial to establish the safety and efficacy of a new
product and, at the same time, to track the drug
response against the genetic profiles of the par-
ticipants. The participants are asked to give a
separate consent to the traditional and the ge-
netic aspects of the trial. What is different about
the consent issues in the one case from the con-
sent issues in the genetic aspects? Clinical tri-
als in this area may have features that distin-
guish them from traditional clinical trials: first,
it should be possible for clinical trials to be-
come more targeted towards specific groups.
For present purposes, however, the salient point
is that they are likely to involve storage of DNA
samples as responses to drugs are tracked over
time, and this raises questions about the feasi-
bility of informed consent. Another key change
from the considerations outlined above con-
cerns feedback: the focus of debate shifts from
discussing an individual’s choice or responsi-
bility to know or not know genetic informa-
tion, towards the issue of whether organisations
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involved in establishing databases have a duty
to give feedback. In the course of the debates
about genetic exceptionalism, generally con-
cerns have been voiced about the possibility of
genuine informed consent in genetics generally
(Chadwick, 2001), for a number of reasons, but
in the case of long term storage of DNA samples
the issues become particularly complex because
of the difficulty of making sense of ‘consent-
ing’ to potential, but presently unforeseeable,
uses of one’s samples at some point in the fu-
ture. The issue of predictability and storage is
key here.
Beyond the issues for individuals, patients
could be stratified according to genetic risk fac-
tors, as they are presently classified by other
risk factors such as high blood pressure. In this
connection the possible implications for par-
ticular population groups should be considered,
in the light of possible differences between eth-
nic groups as regards, for example, slow or
rapid rate of metabolising a drug. Given the
complexity of these issues in relation to research
databases for pharmacogenetic purposes, popu-
lation wide biobanks, such as the proposed Af-
rican-American one, for research and service
delivery purposes are likely to be even more
complicated, and bodies, such as the WHO, are
recognising [in their draft report on genetic
databases] that
The justification for a database is more
likely to be grounded in communal value,
and less on individual gain … it leads to
the question whether the individual can
remain of paramount importance in this
context
And again:
The achievement of optimal advances in
the name of the collective good may re-
quire a reconsideration of the respective
claims so as to achieve an appropriate
balance between individual and collec-
tive interests, including those of ethnic
minorities, from a multi-cultural perspec-
tive (WHO, 2001).
The question arises, then, as to what ethical
resources we should be using in addressing the
issues of genetic databases. The WHO appears
to be suggesting a shift away from the para-
mountcy of the individual in favour of com-
munity interests.
The HUGO Ethics Committee in its State-
ment on Benefit-Sharing in 2000 (HUGO,
2000) addressed the issue of sharing the ben-
efits of genetic research. On the one hand, some
advocate that pharmaceutical companies who
benefit from genomic research should make
some return to the communities and families
who have made increased revenues possible.
On the other hand, those who oppose benefit-
sharing may suggest that people who contrib-
ute samples for research have not themselves
done anything to make their sample valuable,
that their samples become valuable by virtue
of the work done by scientists. Also, a practi-
cal problem in sharing benefits is that many
years could elapse between the original research
and the development of a marketable drug. And
efforts to distribute benefits may be seen as an
attempt to buy people off. Recognising these
difficulties, the HUGO Ethics Committee
(2000) recommended that benefit-sharing
should not be understood only in financial terms
–‘returns’ can be of different kinds, e.g. start-
ing with a ‘thank you – but that companies
should consider investing between 1 and 3%
of their net profits in health care infrastructure
or other humanitarian endeavours.
While benefit-sharing is based on a principle
of equity, according to the principle of solidar-
ity, one could have a duty to facilitate research
progress that could be crucial to the health of
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others, by, for example, making a ‘gift’ of one’s
sample. Turning to principles of solidarity and
equity is a quite different approach from the
individualistic one we considered earlier - the
individual’s right to decide whether to partici-
pate or refuse to participate in genetic research.
It has been suggested that the post-genomic era
might be the right time to rethink informed con-
sent and the right to withdraw from or refuse to
participate in research, provided that appropri-
ate mechanisms regulating access to and use of
the information are in place (Chadwick and
Berg, 2001). As has been suggested above, there
might, in fact, be risk to the individual qua
member of a group, but this point strengthens
the argument that the issues cannot be resolved
by individual informed consent.
Partly because there are collective, rather
than individual, interests to consider, public
participation has moved higher up the agenda.
There might be a number of objectives in pub-
lic participation activities, consideration of
which is beyond the scope of this discussion. I
intend to consider, for present purposes, the
objective of developing a communitarian con-
sensus. Hub Zwart contrasts the liberal perspec-
tive –which has tended to emphasize not only
personal autonomy but also a right to choose
to have health care interventions– with the
communitarian perspective which, according to
Zwart, should aim at developing a consensus
on the goals of medicine. From this point of
view:
the moral agent should not be viewed in
an atomistic way, but rather as situated
in a moral community from which he
derives his moral identity, his substan-
tial moral convictions and his sense of
direction. (Zwart, 1993, 53-4)
Zwart developed this argument in relation
to priority setting in medicine, but it is also rel-
evant to biobanks. Community consensus is not
the same as a majority vote, which could be
prejudicial to the interests of minority groups.
It is dependent on a “normative, deontological
framework defining the meaning of commu-
nity interests” (ten Have, 1993, 45).
It might be objected, however, that in a plu-
ralistic, post-modern society, a communitarian
consensus of this kind is not possible; that the
notion of community is not available (Poole,
1991), or that the effectiveness of the commu-
nity-oriented criterion relies on its power to
exclude - to silence some voices (van
Willigenburg, 1993). Len Doyal has argued:
any local, community-based, small-scale
form of need satisfaction can foster ‘in-
sider’ conceptions of human need and
inhibit the growth of generalisable no-
tions based on a wider collective iden-
tity ... The dream of a community poli-
tics which could unite different groups
... cannot be realised in the absence of
precisely such a cross-cultural and cross-
group source of identity as human need.
(Doyal, 1991, 308-9).
It remains to be seen, therefore, whether
democratic engagement can elucidate the re-
quired sources of collective identity to inform
the debates about population based genomic
research involving biobanks, a collective iden-
tity which goes beyond the majoritarian expres-
sion of individual preferences based on indi-
vidual identity.
Conclusion
At the very least the situation we face in
thinking about the appropriate ethical frame-
work for genetic databases is one of increasing
complexity. The thinking behind the doctrine
of informed consent evolved in a very differ-
ent situation from the one we face in the era of
genomics. It is a context complicated by the
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global context of genetic research in addition
to powerful commercial interests at stake. This
suggests that it is not sufficient to take the ap-
proach of moving from an individual-centred
ethic to a more community-centred approach;
an approach of renegotiating the relationship
between individual and community. This might
be a necessary step, but we need also to be clear
about what the interests at stake are, which may
mean reconceiving the very terms ‘individual’
and ‘community’ in this context and the ways
in which their interests are affected, identify-
ing the sources of collective identity that are at
stake.
It is not quite the picture that Milunsky
(2001) envisages, then, of the individual tak-
ing increasing control. I spoke about the indi-
vidual choosing as a utility maximizer, as re-
sponsible agent, and as choosing what sort of
person they want to be. Even exercising con-
trol over my identity, however, has to be done
with an eye to the context. I have to choose not
what sort of person I want to be in isolation,
but with an eye to my membership of different
groups. What is the case is that every individual
has to consider what the benefits are – what
does it mean to call databases global public
goods – in what sense are the global, what is
meant by public, and what is meant by good –
are they really goods in which we all can share?
The individualistic model that has prevailed so
long has been a reaction to discredited eugenic
policies, which arose from another type of ‘pub-
lic good’ thinking which was inherently dis-
criminatory.
In so far as there are new paradigms in ethi-
cal thinking in this context, this is the key fo-
cus – whether a new public good argument, that
avoids these historic difficulties, can be made
out.
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